A preliminary draft framework in negotiations between the United States and Iran proposes that Tehran transfer its stockpile of highly enriched uranium to a third country agreed by both sides, or alternatively reduce the level to which the material is enriched, according to a document obtained exclusively by Al Arabiya English. The same draft calls for the Strait of Hormuz to be reopened to international maritime traffic within seven days of an initial understanding being reached between the two countries. The report, published from Tehran, offers the clearest glimpse yet of the shape that a prospective understanding between Washington and Tehran could take, with the two most sensitive files, Iran's nuclear material and freedom of navigation in the Gulf, placed at the center of a single framework.

Two headline provisions in the draft

The document, described as a preliminary draft rather than a final agreement, is built around two core proposals, according to Al Arabiya English:

  • Uranium transfer or dilution: Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile would be moved out of the country to an agreed third country, or its enrichment level would be reduced, addressing the issue at the heart of long-running disputes over Tehran's nuclear program.

  • A seven-day timeline for the Strait of Hormuz: The strait would be reopened to international maritime traffic within seven days of an initial understanding, setting an unusually short clock for one of the draft's most consequential commitments.

The pairing of these two provisions in a single text is notable. It suggests that the drafters have sought to link the nuclear file and the maritime file, two issues that have often been handled separately in past diplomacy, into one package that could form the basis of a broader understanding.

Why the uranium stockpile sits at the center

The fate of Iran's highly enriched uranium has long been the most sensitive element in any negotiation over the country's nuclear activities. Highly enriched uranium is the material that most directly raises international concern, because the higher the enrichment level, the shorter the technical distance to weapons-grade material. Proposals to move such a stockpile out of the country, or to reduce its enrichment level, are therefore among the most far-reaching steps that can be put on the table, as they go to the substance of the stockpile itself rather than to monitoring alone.

The draft, as reported, offers two pathways rather than one. Tehran could transfer the stockpile to a third country acceptable to both sides, or it could lower the enrichment level of the material it holds. Presenting alternatives in a preliminary text is a common feature of early-stage drafting, leaving room for the parties to negotiate which mechanism is adopted, and under what conditions, as talks continue. What the draft makes plain is that the disposition of the enriched uranium is treated as a first-order item, one that belongs at the top of any initial understanding rather than at the end of a longer process.

A seven-day clock for the Strait of Hormuz

The draft's second major provision concerns the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and one of the most important arteries for international shipping and global energy supplies. According to the document obtained by Al Arabiya English, the strait would be reopened to international maritime traffic within seven days of an initial understanding between the United States and Iran.

The seven-day timeline stands out. In diplomatic texts, deadlines of this length are typically reserved for measures that the drafters regard as urgent and immediately implementable. By placing a reopening commitment on such a short fuse, the draft signals that unimpeded maritime movement through the waterway is envisaged as an early deliverable, not a distant goal to be reached only after protracted bargaining. For international shipping and for the countries whose trade depends on the strait, the distinction matters: a commitment measured in days is designed to have visible effects almost immediately, while a vague promise of future normalization would not.

An exclusively sourced document, and the questions it leaves open

Al Arabiya English reported that it exclusively obtained the document, and the report was published from Tehran. That provenance gives the text significance, but it also underlines how much remains unresolved. The draft is explicitly described as preliminary, and a preliminary text is, by definition, subject to revision, rejection, or replacement as negotiations proceed.

Several questions are not answered by the reporting available so far:

  • Whether either the United States or Iran has formally endorsed the draft, or whether it remains a working text circulating among the parties.

  • Which third country might be in contention to receive any transferred uranium stockpile, should the transfer option be pursued.

  • How the proposed reduction in enrichment levels would be carried out and verified in practice.

  • What would happen if the seven-day deadline for reopening the Strait of Hormuz were missed.

None of these details appears in the document as reported, and none should be assumed. What can be said with confidence is that the draft's existence indicates a stage of negotiation in which ideas have moved from general positions toward written, structured commitments, with timelines attached.

For now, the draft remains just that: a preliminary framework, obtained and reported by a single outlet, proposing that Iran part with its most sensitive nuclear material and that the Gulf's most vital waterway be restored to normal international traffic within a week of an initial understanding. Whether the text hardens into an agreed document, or is overtaken by events, will determine whether these two proposals are remembered as turning points or as another entry in a long file of unfulfilled drafts.